COMMENTS
DISSOLUTION AND MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL DECREES
ON GROUNDS OF CHANGE OF ATTITUDE
I
The power of federal courts to modify or dissolve injunctions and decrees
enforcing cease and desist orders of administrative agencies has a significant
impact upon the enforcement of regulatory statutes.1 Insofar as such injunctions
and decrees embody findings concerning the status of the litigants at the time
of issuance, they have the same finality as other judgments; but as continuing
regulations of conduct, it is well settled that they are subject to modification
or dissolution to prevent injustice when there is a change in the law or factual
conditions on which they are based However, it has never been clearly established whether, if the enjoined conduct remains indisputably illegal, an increase
in the willingness of the enjoined party to comply with the law justifies modification or dissolution.
In the leading case of United States v. Swift & Co.,3 the Supreme Court
stated that a final, permanent injunction may be modified or dissolved only
upon a clear showing by the enjoined party of serious hardship "evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions. ' 4 In the Swift opinion Mr. Justice Cardozo
I Some of the federal acts which rely for their enforcement entirely or in part on injunctions
or court decrees enforcing the cease and desist orders of governmental agencies are: Clayton
Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §21 (1951); Fair Labor Standards Act,
52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §45 (1951); Interstate Commerce Act, 62
Stat. 931 (1948), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §21 (1951); Labor-Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §160(e)(f) (1956); Securities Exchange
Act, 1934, 48 Stat. 900 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. 78u(e) (1951); Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §4 (1951).
2 E.g., United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 133 F.2d 955 (C.A.7th, 1943); Stewart
Die Casting Corp. v. Y'LRB, 129 F.2d 481 (C.A.7th, 1942); Jones v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 107 F.Supp. 157 (W.D. Pa., 1952). See, Power of the Court to Modify a Final
Permanent Injunction, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 241 (1947).
3 286 U.S. 106 (1932). Swift & Co. requested modification of a consent decree forbidding
it from going into the business of retailing many types of groceries. The request was based
on the contention that market conditions had changed since the issuance of the decree; the
industry had become, it was claimed, more competitive and the retail grocers had improved
their position in relation to wholesalers. The Supreme Court stated that it had power to modify
the decree but held that since Swift & Co. had not proved that the enjoined conduct would no
longer adversely affect its competitors, the requirement-that the danger which the decree
was designed to prevent must be eliminated-had not been met; therefore dissolution could
not be granted.
4286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
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did not speak directly to the question whether this test should be applied
when only the defendant's willingness to comply had changed. No cases
have been found in which the Supreme Court has considered this question.
In three recent decisions, each involving a broad decree prohibiting violation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Courts of Appeals have split on the
issue.
In Tobin v. Alma Mills,5 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the Swift decision did not prevent the dissolution of an injunction when
the enjoined party had demonstrated his willingness to abide, without the
threat of contempt penalties, by the terms of the decree. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the action of the District Judge who, relying on Federal Rule 60(b)
(5) and (6), had dissolved the injunction on the ground that it was no longer
equitable that it should have prospective application. The Eighth Circuit,
in Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co.,8 followed the lead of the Fourth Circuit.
In Walling v. HarniscfegerCorp.,7 however, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin held that it was prevented by the Swift case from giving
relief in a fact situation similar to that presented in the Alma Mills and Little
Rock Packing Co. cases. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.8
5192 F.2d 133 (C.A.4th, 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 933 (1952). Alma Mills petitioned for
dissolution on the ground thatit had complied with the law for more than ten years. The decree,
it was claimed, was hampering a sale of stock. When the FLSA administrator was notified
of the motion for dissolution, he investigated and found only technical violations. The court,
dissolving the decree, held that compliance with the statute for the ten year period was a
change of condition which made it unfair for the judgment to be continued. The Swift case
was distinguished on the ground that the Supreme Court had not found a change of condition
in that case.
Several years earlier a district court in the same circuit held that operation under a decree
for six years without being cited for contempt was sufficient to establish the willingness
of the enjoined party to comply with the FLSA. McComb v. Lexington Lumber Co., 15
CCH Lab. Cas. 64885 (E.D.S.C., 1948). The court held that the change in the willingness
of the party was a ground for dissolution under Rule 60 (b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. No reference was made to the Swift rule.
6 202 F.2d 234 (C.A.8th, 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 832 (1953). The Little Rock Packing
Co. was sued for contempt for allegedly committing certain technical violations of the FLSA.'
The company denied that it was guilty of contempt and requested dissolution of the injunction.
The court acquitted the company of criminal contempt but found it guilty of technical contempt and assessed 400 as costs of the suit. The court dissolved the injunction on the ground
that the company had operated under the decree for nearly ten years and had committed only
technical violations during that period.
7 142 F.Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis., 1956). The court cited the Swift case and argued that, since
it could not be said that the issuing judge had anticipated that the defendant would not
comply with the decree, a change of attitude would not be "unforeseen." This argument
has the effect of changing the standard in the Swift case from "unforeseen" to "unforeseeable."
The latter term apparently includes only those changes which were or would have been thought
improbable had they been considered.
8 242 F.2d 712 (C.A.7th, 1957). There is some doubt about the meaning of the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The District Court had specifically rejected the Alma Mills and
Little Rock Packing Co. cases. However, the Court of Appeals distinguished those cases on
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Only if it (1) is unforeseen and (2) causes a serious hardship for the enjoined
party does a change in the willingness of an enjoined party come within
the Swift doctrine. It is not clear what the Court meant in the Swift case
by the term "unforeseen."
The term "unforeseen" clearly includes those changes which the issuing
judge considered and found improbable. Changes not considered at all would
also seem to fall within the meaning of "unforeseen" regardless of whether
the change, if it had been considered, would have been thought improbable.
No opinion has been found in which the wisdom of limiting the meaning
of "unforeseen" in the Swift rule was discussed. It would seem that because
the common usage of the word connotes any unconsidered change and since,
moreover, there is no indication in the Swift case that the Court meant to give
the word a special meaning, either a change which was considered and found
improbable or an unconsidered change should meet the requirement of being
"unforeseen." It seems unwise to exclude, as did the lower court in the Harnischfeger case,' changes which were not considered but, if they had been, would
have been found probable. Such a limitation of the term "unforeseen" would
prevent the parties from litigating the effect which a particular change should
have.10 It would also be unwise to limit "unforeseen" by requiring that the
issuing judge must have considered the likelihood of a given change. Such
a restriction would make the possibility of modification or dissolution vary
with the diligence and imagination of the issuing judge and the litigants.
The second requirement of the Swift rule is that the "hardship" be "evoked
by" the change of condition. If "hardship" means simply "handicap," a change
of attitude cannot satisfy the "evoked by" requirement. It cannot be said
that one who is willing to comply with a decree bears more of a burden than
one who is unwilling to comply. If, however, the term "hardship" implies an
element of injustice--an unfair handicap-then the "evoked by" requirement
the ground that they involved the granting of dissolution by district courts while the Harnischfeger case involved a denial of dissolution by the District Court. It might be argued that the
Court of Appeals was resting its decision on the ground that the district judge had considerable
discretion in dissolving decrees. However, it seems unlikely that such a position would be
taken in a case in which the District Court had stated that "in the event this court is erroneous
in its view of the position of (the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit] defendant has
a ready and inexpensive remedy by way of appeal." 142 F.Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Wis., 1956).
9 See note 7 supra.
10It would be impossible to anticipate all possible changes of condition. It would, moreover,
be excessively time consuming if the attorneys were to litigate the effect which the many
conceivable changes should have. Assume that the effect of X, a change of condition which
would have been considered probable, is not litigated at the issuance proceeding and later
occurs. Dissolution will not be granted if it is sought on the ground that it was probable
that X would occur. Thus at no time has the enjoined party had the opportunity to litigate
the effect which X should have.
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may be met. While it may be just to impose special disabilities on a party
whose conduct demonstrates opposition to the law, it seems unfair to impose
the same disabilities on a party who will comply with the law without the
threat of penalties. Consequently, if a liberal interpretation of "unforeseen"
and "hardship" is adopted, decrees may be modified or dissolved on grounds of
change in willingness to comply; if a restrictive interpretation of those terms
is used, the enjoined party cannot obtain relief.
If a restrictive interpretation of the Swift rule is followed, anomalous results
will be produeed. An injunction is issued only after two elements are established: (1) that certain conduct is illegal or will produce an illegal result and
(2) that the defendant, if not enjoined, will probably engage in such conduct."1
It is well established that a change in the first element is sufficient to warrant
dissolution or modification. There seems to be no reason why a change in the
second element should not have the same effect.
The significance of attitude, and therefore the degree of anomaly, depends
onseveral factors. Where the scope of a decree is narrow and the terms specific,
as for example when the FTC secures a decree forbidding a manufacturer from
adding a certain chemical to his product, the defendant's attitude may be
unimportant. Where a broad range of conduct is prohibited by a decree and the
prohibitions represent clarifications or previously uncertain points of law, the
primary issue litigated is likely to be that of the legality of the conduct rather
than the defendant's attitude. In such a case, though, as will be discussed later, 2
an increase in the defendant's willingness to comply may well be significant
for purposes of granting dissolution or modification of the decree. Attitude may
also be important with respect to decrees which the issuing court phrased in
broad terms because the defendant demonstrated hostility to all or major portions of a statute. Decrees enjoining conduct of a type different from the
illegal acts performed before the issuance proceeding is permissible only where
the defendant has shown that he is hostile to the statute in general. Such
decrees are frequently phrased in terms of broad statutory language indicating
that the legality of the conduct prohibited by that part of the decree was not
in question since the statute is determinative on that point. 3 Where, as in:
n Even where past offenses have been committed, a court need not issue an injunction if
it believes that future compliance can be secured without the threat of contempt penalties.
See cases cited in The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies,
57 Yale L. 3. 1023 (1948). The decree may cover violations of a sort not yet committed by
a party. This is done when the defendant's attitude shows that the decree is needed to prevent
a broad range of activities. NLRB v. United Mine Workers, 202 F.2d 177 (C.A.3d, 1953).
See note 13 infra.
2

See discussion at 665 infra.

13Such decrees were common under the National Labor Relations Act during the late

1930's. It has been held that the NLRB has the same powers as a court of equity in determining
the scope of its decrees and that the test to be applied by the courts is whether the Board

could reasonably conclude from the evidence that the defendant's hostility to the statute was
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these cases, attitude has played a major part in determining the issuance or
scope of a decree, it would seem justifiable to grant dissolution if the enjoined
party demonstrates a marked increase in his willingness to comply with the
terms of the decree.
The anomaly which results from refusing to grant dissolution in such
cases is made more striking by the consideration that, while the illegality of the
conduct is usually hotly litigated at the proceedings for the issuance of the
decree, the question of attitude often may not be brought sharply into focus.
The finding of the court about the defendant's attitude at the time of the
decree may be largely pro fornum. There is unlikely to be a reasoned decision
about how long the defendant will probably violate the law. These considerations buttress the conclusion that it is unjust to perpetuate a decree when the
enjoined party can demonstrate a substantial increase in his willingness to
abide by the law. Thus, opinions like that in the Harnisckfegercase appear unsound.
Such opinions cannot be supported, as the District Court in Harnischfeger
tried to do, on the ground that because the issuing judge made the decree
"permanent" and that he would probably have considered a change of attitude
probable, 14 he must have meant the decree to continue despite such a change.
To refuse dissolution on such grounds seems unreasonable unless the possibility
of the change in question was actually litigated at the issuance proceeding.
Such a refusal, moreover, cannot be reconciled with the long-established
principle that dissolution may be secured when there is a change in the law
or factual conditions upon which a decree is based; for it is probable that the
issuing judge would not have thought that the law and facts on which the decree
is based would remain forever unchanged.
Although it thus appears reasonable to grant modification or dissolution when
an enjoined party proves his willingness to comply with the law, a court
cannot, as has been shown, take such action so long as the Swift rule is narrowly
construed and held applicable. Therefore, unless the enjoined party can obtain
the relief he needs through procedures for determining whether certain contemplated action violates the terms of the decree under which he is operating, it
such that a decree of the scope used was necessary to prevent him from violating the statute.
May Stores Co. v. NRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945). Under this rule, injunctions which have the
effect of prohibiting the enjoined party from interfering in any way with the rights of employees
to bargain collectively have been sustained on findings that the employer had offered to make
wage increases once the employees had disaffiliated themselves from the union and polled the
employees to see if they wished to remain in the union. NLRB v. Charles R. Krimm Lumber
Co., 203 F.2d 194 (C.A.2d, 1953). Accord: NNLRB v. May Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533 (C.A.8th,
1946); NLRB v. Reeves Rubber Co., 153 F.2d 340 (C.A.9th, 1946). But cf. NLRB v. Matthews
& Co., 156 F.2d 706 (C.A.3d, 1946); NTLRB v. Federal Engineering Co., 153 F.2d 233 (C.A.6th,
1946).
14The court spoke in terms of compliance rather than of change in attitude. However,
it is difficult to see any significance in the amount of time during which the defendant has
complied except as evidence of a change in attitude.
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would seem sensible to give a liberal interpretation to the Swift rule or else
hold it inapplicable.
The enjoined party can obtain some relief through procedures for determining
whether the acts he contemplates will subject him to contempt penalties.
He may be able to maintain a suit for a declaratory judgment.15 The near
equivalent of a declaratory judgment can be obtained from administrative
agencies authorized to issue declaratory orders subject to judicial review. 6 If
this procedure is constitutional 7 and made easily available, 18 defendants
operating under decrees obtained by such agencies can mitigate the hardships.
However, obtaining relief by such procedures is often costly and slow. Moreover, only immediate problems are solved; the enjoined party must still operate
under the decree. It would, therefore, seem that dissolution or modification
are the most practicable methods of providing relief. To grant dissolution
or modification, the Swift rule must, as pointed out above, be construed
liberally or held inapplicable.
Neither course is unjustifiable. Neither the facts nor the opinion in the
Swift case in any way indicate that the Court considered the question what
effect a change of attitude should have on a decree. The case could therefore
be distinguished. Perhaps the most feasible solution is to liberally construe the
Swift rule. The liberal interpretations suggested above for the terms "unforeseen" and "hardship" comport with the normal usage of those words. The
case for the liberal interpretations is strengthened by the fact that Rule 60(b)
(5) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated since
the Swift decision. That rule was said to embody existing law.19 Its emphasis
is on fairness and justice for the enjoined party. It provides that a fair balancing
of the competing interests should govern the dissolution or modification
of injunctions. 0 The interests to be balanced are the hardships to the enjoined
1 Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 At. 275 (1928); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments
181 (1st ed., 1934). See also Fraser, A Survey of Declaratory Judgment Actions in the United

States, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 639 (1954); Pugh, The Federal Declaratory Remedy: Justiciability,
Jurisdiction and Related Problems, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 79 (1952); Injunctions-Possibility of
Clarification by Declaratory Judgment, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 310 (1939).
1
6Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. §1004 (Supp., 1950).
17 A provision for judicial review of the declaratory orders of agencies would be unconstitutional unless it can be said that a case or controversy is created by the orders. The case or
controversy requirement may be satisfied. In Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351
U.S. 40 (1956), the Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from a declaratory order of the ICC specifying which commodities were within the
agricultural exemption provision in the Interstate Commerce Act.
Is For a discussion of advisory and declaratory opinions and some of the situations in which
an agency will give such opinions, see Davis, Cases on Administrative Law 242-67 (1951).
196 Moore, Federal Practice §60.01(8) (2d ed., 1948).
20Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b): "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
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party which will persist if the injunction is continued and the hardships which
dissolution or modification entails for the party who is protected by the injunction.
The major hardship for the enjoined party is an economic one. He is restricted
in taking new steps. If an injunction is broad in scope or vague in phrasing
a very large number of activities may be closed off to the enjoined party.
If he did not operate under the injunction he would not be subject to contempt
sanctions for incorrectly predicting what conduct is illegal. He would be subject
only to those sanctions which the law would impose on his competitors. Moreover, if a governmental agency regulates the area of conduct, any unpredictability in the agency's actions will aggravate the hardship of the enjoined party.
Finally, the enjoined party may be subject to the burden of being punished
in a contempt proceeding where he does not have the procedural protections
provided in a trial for violating the law.2'
If the enjoined party is truly willing to abide by the law, the party protected
by the injunction should not suffer any hardships if the decree is modified
or dissolved. Safeguards should, though, be established to ensure that the
enjoined party does have the requisite attitude. The party protected by
the decree should not be put to the expense of petitioning for a second decree
if the first is dissolved on inadequate grounds. Nor should he have to defend
frequent actions for dissolution.2 It would seem wise to demand that attitude
be proved by objective facts. The only method successfully used to date is
proof of compliance with the decree over an extended period of time. 3 One
court has implied that a major change in the decision-making personnel
for the following reasons:... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of a judgment."
21 For information on the subject of contempt penalties and procedures, see Moskovitz,
Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Col. L. Rev. 780 (1943); Affording Defendant
Opportunity to Exculpate Himself, 22 Wash. L. Rev. 150 (1947). When imposing penalties
for contempt the courts consider the good faith of the defendant a relevant factor. See NLRB
v. Athens Mfg. Co., 163 F.2d 255 (C.A.5th, 1947); McComb v. Norris, 16 CCH Lab.Cas.
65198 (E.D.S.C., 1949). However, sometimes the contempt penalty may be set by a statute.
For example, violations of the anti-trust laws are punishable by a fine of $50,000. 69 Stat.
282 (1955), 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (Supp., 1957). If a party is subject to a final cease and desist order
of the FTC, he may be fined $5,000 for each violation; each separate day of non-compliance
constitutes a separate violation. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §45(1) (1951).
2 On this ground the court in People v. Durkin, 191 Misc. 342, 77 N.Y.S.2d 442 (S.Ct.,
1948), refused to allow dissolution of a decree enjoining a party from trading in stocks. He had
shown that he had been leading an exemplary life since he was enjoined.
21 In Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co., 202 F.2d 234 (C.A.8th, 1953), and Tobin v. Alma
Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (C.A.4th, 1951), a ten year period was considered sufficient. In McComb
v. Lexington Lumber Co., 15 CCH Lab.Cas. 164885 (E.D.S.C., 1948), dissolution was allowed
after six years of compliance. In the Harnischfeger case, 142 F.Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis., 1956),
the defendant had complied for twelve years when dissolution was sought and refused.
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of an enjoined company would be relevant in proving a change of attitude.2 '
A requirement that such objective facts be shown will safeguard the party
protected by the decree.
The public has an interest which reinforces that of the party who obtained
the decree; for, the threat of an injunction serves as a deterrent. The public
interest in maintaining the force of this deterrence should be considered in
any dissolution proceeding.
A reasonable compromise of the interests of the enjoined party, the public
and the party who obtained the injunction might be achieved by the issuance
of decrees labelled "indefinite" (instead of "permanent") with a provision that
dissolution could not be requested prior to a specified date on the ground of
a change in attitude.2? It would then be realistic to say that the question
of the duration of the decree had been adjudicated and the possibility of a
change in the willingness of the enjoined party to comply had been fully
considered. If this suggested compromise were adopted the decree might still
outlast its need but it would do so only for a very limited period. The deterrent
value of injunctions could be protected by adjusting the length of the period
during which dissolution could not be obtained on the ground of a change in
attitude.
The issuing court should take into account such factors as good faith in
attempting to comply with the law, willingness to conform to suggestions
made by government agencies, the nature of the illegal conduct and the scope
of the decree. In proceedings for modification or dissolution the court should
consider not only these factors but also the conduct of the enjoined party
since the injunction was issued, adoption of procedures making future compliance likely and changes in management
24Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (C.A.4th, 1951). In the Harnischfeger case, the district court specifically found that there had not been substantial changes in management.
It avoided stating whether such changes would have justified dissolution. Since the court
almost suggested that the defendant appeal, it was probably trying to eliminate the necessity
of having the case remanded for findings of new facts in case the appellate court should decide
that a showing that future violations were not to be expected was a ground for granting
dissolution.
2
6This was done in Tobin v. Neely, 22 CCH Lab.Cas. 67285 (N.D. Ga., 1952). The period
allowed was one year; when the year expired the enjoined party was granted dissolution
even though technical violations had been committed during the year. In Tobin v. Cherry
River Boom and Lumber Co., 102 F.Supp. 763 (S.D. W.Va., 1952), the court issued an
injunction against violations of the FLSA but provided that the defendant could request
dissolution when he fully complied with the Act.
26As indicated in the introduction, the analysis given applies to court-enforced cease and
desist orders of administrative agencies as well as to injunctions. The same policy reasons
apply to both. No cases have been found in which a party sought to have an order modified
or dissolved on the sole ground of a change in attitude; but it is clear that, like injunctions,
enforcement orders can be modified or dissolved on the basis of changes in law or factual conditions. American Chain and Cable Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 909 (C.A.4th, 1944); Century
Metalcraft Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 443 (C.A.7th, 1940). The general rule seems to be that if
the agency has been given power to modify its orders even after enforcement by the court,

